The Extent of Adopting a Hierarchical Interpretative Structure by the ILC in Arts 31-2 of the VCLT to Remove the Legal Uncertainty from Treaty Interpretation by Al-Zubi, Ali
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.59, 2017 
 
191 
The Extent of Adopting a Hierarchical Interpretative Structure 
by the ILC in Arts 31-2 of the VCLT to Remove the Legal 
Uncertainty from Treaty Interpretation 
 
Ali Al-Zubi 
Department of Law , Albalqa Applied University , Jordan 
 
Abstract 
Treaty interpretation is a matter of legal uncertainty because of not having a hierarchical structure to regulate 
implementing interpretative rules. Therefore, Some interpretative schools, such as the textual, the contextual and 
the objective and purpose are emerged; each school believes its approach the most effective to achieve the goal 
from treaty interpretation. Although the ILC sought to resolve this uncertainty through codifying interpretative 
norms in Articles 31 and 332 of the VCLT, it is argued that the ILC failed in achieving this goal because of not 
codifying a hierarchical structure to regulate applying interpretative norms. Nonetheless, reviewing ILC’s 
relevant reports and the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties 1968 leads to reach a hierarchical 
structure regulates implementing interpretative rules. This structure stipulates firstly resorting to the textual 
approach; however, if the text is insufficient, the contextual approach shall be directly resorted to. Regarding the 
purpose and objective approach, it shall not be implemented in isolation from other approaches to avoid 
exploiting it to achieve self-interests. Regarding supplementary means, they can be exclusively used to either 
confirm reached interpretations by the aforementioned approaches or to decide which meaning is correct when 
these aforementioned approaches lead to either obscure or ambiguous meanings or to unreasonable or unclear 
result. 
 
Introduction  
Treaty interpretation aims to reach the correct meaning of conventional texts1 that reflects members’ common 
intention2 by using various interpretative rules and principles.3 This topic has been a subject of debate among 
scholars who concern about applying the most proper interpretative rule to achieve the goal of treaty 
interpretation.4 Some scholars argue the correct meaning can be elucidated by discovering the common intention 
of treaty’ members, while others believe the correct meaning can be reached by elucidating legal texts’ ordinary 
meaning in the light of the agreements purpose and object.5 As a consequence of this debate, treaty interpretation 
was considered and sought to be tackled by the International Law Commission (‘ILC’) that codified some 
general interpretative principles in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (‘VCLT’), particularly in 
Articles 31 and 326 that have been widely referred to by tribunals even they have been considered as a part of 
international customary law.7 Indeed, creating a unified interpretative mechanism is importance to avoid the 
fragmentation of international law because of proliferating treaties that constitute various legal institutions along 
with jurisdictions overlapping with each other8 which undermines the integrity of international law because of 
the lack of hierarchy to determine such jurisdictions’ boundaries.9 
Nonetheless, it is critiqued that the VCLT does not regulate the topic of treaty interpretation because of 
not providing a hierarchical structure with respect to apply interpretative rules. Therefore, this research paper 
considers this criticism by examining the implicit hierarchy that is adopted by Article 31 and 32 of the VCLT in 
accordance to the implementation of included interpretative in the light of international law’s norms and 
principles and tribunals’ practice. This research paper consists from three parts; firstly, discussing the attitude of 
the ILC with respect to codify interpretative rules in the VCLT as a consequence of the uncertain attitude of 
                                                          
1
 See, Martin Ris, 'Treaty interpretation and ICJ recourse to Travaux Preparatoires: towards a proposed amendment of articles 
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties' (1991) 14(1) Boston College International and Comparative Law 
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international tribunals in the context of treaty interpretation. The second part discusses the scope of interpretative 
rules that are codified in Article 31 and 32 of the VCLT; this discussion considers different views if scholars with 
respect to the application of interpretative rules by clarifying alleged restrictions on this application. The third 
part seeks to summaries the overall approach that is adopted by the VCLT in Articles 31 and 32 with regard to 
the implementation of interpretative rules. This aims to crystalize the implicit hierarchical structure that is 
adopted by the VCLT in Articles 31 and 32 with respect to apply interpretative rules; this can be achieved 
through referring to relevant reports of the ILC with respect to conclude the VCLT since these reports can be 
supportive in interpreting the VCLT. 
 
Part ONE : Uncertain Practice of Tribunals & ILC 
In the past, tribunals used to apply the restrictive interpretative approach because of granting the supremacy to 
the sovereignty of states during the stage of interpreting treaties; this led to prevail the sovereignty in the process 
of treaty interpretation.1 This approach was evident in decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 
the International Court of Justice and other tribunal arbitrations.2 The Permanent Court of International Justice 
declared when the text was unclear to choose between various acceptable interpretations, the most acceptable 
interpretation would be the one that enforced the minimum level of responsibility on parties.3 It seems that this 
restrictive approach of treaty interpretation would aim to protect states’ freedom.4 However, this approach has 
not been applied anymore because of changing the political perspective and prevailing international jurisdiction 
on domestic jurisdictions.5 
Consequently, new interpretative approaches have been emerged 6  along with the new attitude of 
international tribunals to adopt the textual approach in the light of not having hierarchy regarding the 
implementation interpretative rules.7 However, the legal uncertainty in the context of treaty interpretation has not 
been resolved because the practice of tribunals have been neither consistent nor harmony with respect to treaty 
interpretation. For instance, international tribunals have not exclusively relied on the textual approach in the 
process of treaty interpretation8 in the light of existing other interpretative rules; therefore, the implementation of 
any interpretative rule is relevant to the liberal standard because of the lack of hierarchy to regulate the 
application of these interpretative rules.9 Some scholars consider the intentional approach as the correct method 
in the field of treaty interpretation, while others believe that the contextual approach is the correct interpretative 
approach that can lead to discover the correct meaning.10 In fact, the gravity of this legal uncertainty lies in the 
probability of departing from the function of treaty interpretation to the unacceptable result of revising treaties11 
because of seeking to reach the common intention of parties not only from the text12 by resorting to other 
interpretative rules.13 Accordingly, it is argued that the consequence of this uncertain attitude has raised the 
probability of shifting from the task of interpreting treaties to the task of modifying and revising treaties14 
because of referring to external texts and considering external materials.15  
Subsequently, the ILC has considered the necessity of tackling this uncertainty with respect to adopt 
interpretative rules; the ILC attributes this dilemma to the attitude of exploring the common intention of parties16 
and referring to external materials other than the text of treaty in question such as circumstances of negotiating 
                                                          
1
 See, L. Crema and Luigi Crema, 'Disappearance and New Sightings of Restrictive Interpretation(s)' (2010) 21(3) European 
journal of international law 681, 681-5. 
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 See, ibid. 
3
 Interpretation of Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Turkey v Iraq) (Advisory Opinion) [1925] PICJ, No12, 
25. 
4
 Territorial Jurisdiction of Int’l Comm’n of River Oder (U.K. v. Pol.) [1929] PCIJ (ser. A) No. 23 [71]. 
5
 See, Iron Rhine case, (Belgium v the Netherlands) (Award) (Permanent Court of Interpretation, Case No 2003-02, 24 May 
2005) [24], [53]. 
6
 See, ibid [49]. 
7
 Sinclair, above n 5, 114. 
8
 See, Iron Rhine case, (Belgium v the Netherlands) (Award) (Permanent Court of Interpretation, Case No 2003-02, 24 May 
2005) [53]. 
9
 See, Maarten Bos, ‘Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation’ (1980) 27(2) Netherlands International Law Review 135. 
10
 See, Peter Maki and C. Peter, ‘Interpreting GATT Using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Method to 
Increase the Legitimacy of the Dispute Settlement System' (2000) 9 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 34. 
11
 McNair, above n 2, 366. See also, Robert R. Wilson, 'INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES' (1930) 24 (04/23) Proceedings 
of the American Society of International Law at its annual meeting (1921) 39. 
12
 See, H. Lauterpacht, 'Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the Interpretation of Treaties' (1935) 48(4) Harvard law 
review 549. 
13
 Ris, above n 1. 
14
 See, Lauterpacht, above n 23. 
15
 ‘Law of Treaties’ (1966) II (2) YILC, 221 [11]. 
16
 Ibid 53. 
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treaties1 to determine which interpretative norm would be more suitable to reach the correct meaning.2 For 
instance, it is argued that either preparatory works or the purpose and object of treaty can be an effective method 
to determine the common intention of parties however this may lead to undermine the importance of the text.3 As 
a consequence to this legal uncertainty, treaty interpretation has been considered as a nightmare that can lead to 
unforeseen consequences and results4 that can directly affect the legal status of parties.5  
As a result, the ILC in 1969 collected in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT some general interpretative 
principles6 that have been granted more recognition because of applying them by international tribunals and 
states practice,7  even Article 31 is declared as an international customary rule.8  Although the VCLT has a 
remarkable role in the context of treaty interpretation,9 it is critiqued that the VCLT has failed in providing a 
hierarchical structure with regard to adopt interpretative rules. It is argued that the ILC used the title ‘general rule 
of interpretation’ with Article 31and this reflects the equivalence between all interpretative rules10 since this 
article does not exclusively adopt the textual interpretative rule.11 Therefore, this research paper realizes the 
importance of discussing whether the VCLT implicitly adopts a hierarchical structure with respect to adopt the 
interpretative rules; this can be achieved through reviewing the attitude of the ILC along with international 
tribunals’ practice since the implementation of interpretative rules can be considered as a consequence of the 
judicial creativeness and practice.12  
 
Part two : Articles 31 & 32: Interpretative Rules  
The significance of treaty interpretation has led to appear different interpretative approaches along with various 
views concern about which interpretative rule can be the most effective one to reach the correct meaning. These 
different views have been divided into three famous interpretative approaches that are the textual, the contextual 
and the purpose and object.13 VCLT refers to these approaches in Article 31(1) that asserts ‘[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose’. Firstly, it is importance to discuss the scope and boundaries of 
these interpretative approaches in order to clarify the function of each rule along with the good faith principle.  
 
Textual Approach  
The textual approach concentrates on the text’s terms and phrases14 to reach the ordinary meaning of the this 
text15 by considering the text as an essential method in the process of interpretation through reflecting the 
common intention of treaties’ drafters.16 This ordinary meaning is relevant to the grammatical and the literal 
interpretation that constitutes the language of treaty in the authentic version.17 This is compatible with Article 
31(1) of the VCLT that stipulates interpreting treaties shall be consistent with the ordinary meaning;18 this has 
been reflected in the context of the textual approach that is referred to as a first step in treaty interpretation by 
arguing that the textual approach prevails on other interpretative approaches19 to elucidate the meaning of the 
                                                          
1
 Gillian Triggs, International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices (New South Wales: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd 
ed, 2011) 121. 
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 Martin Dixon, Cases and Materials on International Law / by Martin Dixon, Robert McCorquodale, Sarah Williams (OUP, 
5th ed, 2011) 81. See, McNair, above n 2, 364. 
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 See, Brownlie, above n 6, 631. 
7
 See, Briggs, above n 7. 
8
 See, McLachlan, above n 8. 
9
 Crema and Crema, above n 12, 692. 
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 Ris, above n 1. 
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 Ibid. See, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 art 31(1).  
12
 Sinclair, above n 5, 114. 
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 Stephen Hall, Principles of international law (Chatswood, N.S.W.: LexisNexis Butterworths 3rd ed, 2011) 108. 
14
 Treaty Interpretation: General Principles of International Law, International Judicial Monitor.  
15
 Mark Eugen. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
c2009., 2009) 421. 
16
 Ulf Linderfalk, 'Is the Hierarchical Structure of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention Real or Not? Interpreting the 
Rules of Interpretation' (2007) 54(01) (05) Netherlands International Law Review 133, 29-30. See, Sir Ian McTaggart 
Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (MUP, 1984) 134. 
17
 Polish Postal Service in Danzig (Advisory Opinion) [1925] PICJ (ser B) No11, 37. See. Francis G. Jacobs and Francis G. 
Jacobs, 'Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: with Special Reference to the Convention on the Law of Treaties 
before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference' (1969) 18(2) The International and comparative law quarterly 318, 138.  
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 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 art 31(1). 
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 See, David S. Jonas, 'The object and purpose of a treaty: three interpretive methods' (2010) 43(3) (05/01) Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 565. 
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text1 that reveals the common intention as long as this meaning is consistent with the purpose and the object of 
the agreement.2  
Proponents of the textual approach argues that other interpretative approaches may not be resorted to, 
when the textual approach achieves the goal of treaty interpretation.3 Consequently, proponents of the textual 
approach invoke that investigating the common intention of parties can be targeted,4 when the textual approach 
leads to ambiguous and unforeseen meaning.5  On the other hand, it is argued that resorting to the textual 
approach in isolation from other interpretative rules to discover the ordinary meaning of the text’s phrases and 
terms may lead to various meanings.6 Therefore, other interpretative rules and approaches such as preparatory 
works shall be resorted to in order to decide which meaning is correct.7 However, the VCLT tackles this issue in 
Article 31(1) that stipulates that the ordinary meaning shall be consistent with the agreements’ context. 8 
Therefore, the contextual approach shall be resorted to, when the textual approach leads to various meanings. 
 
Contextual Approach  
It is noticeable that the textual approach may lead to various ordinary meanings therefore there is a need to 
consider the contextual approach that is based on the notion of contextualizing the meaning of terms instead of 
relying only on their ordinary meanings. Contextualizing the meaning of the text’s phrases and terms requires 
considering the entire treaty to activate its provisions9 instead of limiting the scope of interpretation to specific 
conventional provisions or specific parts of this treaty in isolation from other contents.10 This is because terms 
and phrases do not have meaning by themselves11 since they are not drafted in isolation from other parts of their 
treaty.12 Accordingly, the treaty in question shall be considered as one unit by considering different parts of this 
treaty during the time of interpreting its provisions.13 Accordingly, it is argued that contextual approach is 
effective to avoid reaching various interpretations that are resulted from exclusively using the textual approach 
therefore a single interpretative norm shall not be used without considering other norms.14  
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 31 considers the scope of the contextual approach by indicating:  
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty.  
3.There shall be taken into account, together with the context:  
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions;  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
The contextual approach expands the scope of interpretation by considering the entire agreement to 
reach the precise meaning instead of limiting this scope to specific provision; this therefore leads to reach 
                                                          
1
 Law of Treaties’ (1966) II (2) YILC, 220. 
2
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 art 31(1). See, Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a 
State to the U.N (Advisory opinion) [1950] ICJ 4 N 9, 9-10. 
3
 McNair, above n 2, 366. See, Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad) (Judgment) [1994] ICJ 6 N 83, 25 [51]. 
4
 McNair, above 2, 367. See, Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations ( Greece v. Turkey) (Advisory Opinion) [1925] 
PCIJ (ser B) No 10, [50].  
5
 See, Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the U.N (Advisory opinion) [1950] ICJ No 9, 7-8. 
6
 See above n 44. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Mark E. Villiger, Customary international law and treaties : a study of their interactions and interrelations, with special 
consideration of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht; Boston: M. Nijhoff ; Hingham, MA : 
Distributors for the U.S. and Canada, Kluwer Academic, 1985) 343. 
9
 Sinclair, above n 5, 127. 
10
 McNair, above n 2, 381. See, Competence of the Int’l Labour Org. in regard to Int’l Regulation of Conditions of Labour of 
Persons Employed in Agriculture (Advisory Opinion) [1922] PICJ (ser B) No 2, [24]. 
11
 Jacobs and Jacobs, above n 44. 
12
 Villiger, above n 42, 427. See, Polish Postal Service in Danzig (Advisory Opinion) [1925] PICJ (ser B) No11, 39. 
13
 Linderfalk, above n 43, 30. See, Treaty Interpretation: General Principles of International Law, International Judicial 
Monitor. 
14
 See, Hall., above n 40, 109. See, McTaggart Sinclair, above n 43, 127-130. 
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meanings more compatible with the agreement. Accordingly, an agreement’s preamble and its purpose are 
considered significant to determine the common intention and to elucidate provisions’ meanings,1 as well as the 
treaty’s annexes are helpful to elucidate terms’ meaning, when the text is insufficient.2 Moreover, the contextual 
approach embraces external relevant instruments that are subsequent3 or concurrent4 to the time of establishing 
the treaty5 as long as parties established these instruments or accepted them if they are established by one or 
more parties.6 However, these external instruments shall be authentic, binding, reliable, unified and established 
by either all members or for all members;7 nonetheless, it shall taken into account that these external instruments 
do not form a part of the agreement which is subject to the interpretation.8   
The contextual approach includes instruments or agreements that are established either between all 
parties or ‘by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other 
parties9 as an instrument related to the treaty’10 for the purpose of either implementing the latter or interpreting 
its provisions,11 and explanatory reports and conferences’ final acts.12 Furthermore, the contextual approach 
embraces subsequent agreements between parties with respect to either interpret or implement the treaty, and any 
subsequent practice with respect to apply the treaty.13 It shall be noticed that the subsequent practice shall be 
frequent, consistent and either performed by all parties or acquiesced by them, when specific parties have 
performed it.14 However, the subsequent practice can be resorted to for determining the common intention of 
parties, only when the text is unclear;15 this is important to avoid the possibility of misusing this instrument by a 
way leads to revise the treaty by modifying obligations and rights16 because this result is irrelevant to treaty 
interpretation.17  
Additionally, the context shall be operated along with applicable relevant norms and general principle 
of international law, agreements and international customs regarding relations between parties; 18  therefore, 
subsequent development in international law and international custom shall be taken into account.19 Indeed, 
these instruments are effective in supporting the unity and harmony of international law to avoid fragmenting the 
latter.20 However, these instruments shall be applicable and binding to all parties of the treaty at the moment of 
interpreting it,21 even if this treaty does not relate to these instruments.22 Nevertheless, these instruments shall 
not be used to deviate from the treaty in question since other agreements may have different circumstance, even 
if they have identical texts, context and preparatory works. 23  As a result, the contextual approach is the 
cornerstone of interpretation since it leads to reach the correct meaning of the text through considering external 
instruments and agreements. However, it shall be considered that ‘[a] special meaning shall be given to a term if 
it is established that the parties so intended’;24 this special meaning however may be incompatible with the 
ordinary meaning.25 
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 Sinclair, above n 5, 127-128.  
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 Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad) (Judgment) [1994] ICJ 6 No 83, [48]. 
3
 Vienna convention on the law of treaties 1969 art 31(3). 
4
 Ibid art 31(2). 
5
 Ibid art 31 (2) and (3). 
6
 Villiger, n 42, 429. 
7
 Ibid. See, ‘Law of Treaties’ (1964) I YILC, 313 [53]. 
8
 Ibid 221. 
9
 Ibid. See, Villiger, above n 42, 430. 
10
 Vienna convention on the law of treaties 1969 art 31(2). 
11
 Villiger, above n 42, 430. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Vienna convention on the law of treaties 1969 art 31(3).  
14
 Villiger, above n 42, 432. See, Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Judgment, Advisory opinion and Orders) [1949] ICJ 
171 No 1, 25. 
15
 See, Interpretation of Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Turkey v Iraq) (Advisory Opinion) [1925] PICJ 
(ser B) No12, 24; Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Yugo.) (Judgment) [1929] PCIJ (ser A) No. 20, 
[79]. 
16
 See, Villiger, above n 54, 429, 432; G. G Lawrie, 'Application and Interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties;' (1972) 2 Hong Kong Law Journal 261. 
17
 See, Maarten Bos, 'Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation' (1980) 27(2) Netherlands International Law Review 135.  
18
 Vienna convention on the law of treaties 1969 art 31(3)(c). See, Linderfalk, above n 43.  
19
 Villiger, above n 54, 269. See, McTaggart Sinclair, above n 43, 138-140. 
20
 See, McLachlan, above n 8; Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.) (Judgment) [2003] ICJ 161, [41]. 
21
 Vienna on the Law of Treaties 1969 art 2.(g). See, Villiger, above n 54, 433. 
22
 Ibid 432. 
23
 See, Mox Plant case (Ireland v. the United Kingdom) (Order) (2001) International Tribunal for the Law of The Sea No 10, 
[50]-[51]. 
24
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 art 31(4). 
25
 Villiger, above n 54, 343. 
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The Purpose and Object Approach 
In accordance to the VCLT, the ordinary meaning shall be compatible with the purpose and object of the treaty1 
that can be determined through considering the whole treaty.2 The purpose and objective determine covered 
matters by the treaty and the reason behind covering them.3 This has been embodied in the purpose and object 
approach that is called the teleological approach; it is invoked that this approach can be liberally resorted to for 
the purpose of reaching the correct meaning that reflects the common intention of parties; this common intention 
is embodied in the treaty’s objective4 which is reflected in its preamble.5 It is debated that this approach is 
significant to limit using the contextual approach that ignores the common intention of parties.6 However, it is 
critiqued that various common intentions may be reached regarding multilateral agreements that have many 
members by relying on the purpose and objective approach7 or the latter may impact the legal status of acceding 
parties who may face unforeseen responsibilities.8 Also, it is argued that the purpose and the object of an 
agreement may be ineffective to reach the common intention of parties that is reflected in the ordinary meaning 
of the text as long as this meaning is compatible with purpose and object;9 therefore, the text shall not be ignored 
by resorting to the objective and purpose approach.10 This argument reflects the objective and purpose approach 
shall be resorted to as either a secondary or supplementary instrument,11 not as a primary approach, 12 when the 
text is ambiguous.13 Accordingly, these conditions restrict and limit the purpose and object approach14 in order to 
not use this approach to deviate from the text and its goal by a way that leads to revise the treaty.15  
 
Supplementary Means of Interpretation 
The VCLT conforms in Article 32 that supplementary means of interpretation such as preparatory works can be 
resorted to either ‘confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning 
when reached interpretation according to article 31 either leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a 
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’. The treaty’s preparatory work compromise belonged 
materials to the treaty either before or after the time of concluding it such as negotiations and other formal 
circumstances at the time of concluding it, minutes of conference, memoranda and drafts of the treaty.16 It is 
worthy noting that, considering preparatory works excludes negotiations that are either confidential or limited to 
non-disputant parties.17 Nonetheless, those supplementary means can be resorted to, when the aforementioned 
interpretative approaches which are referred to in Article 31 lead to either obscure, manifest, unreasonable or 
ambiguous meaning. 18  Accordingly, resorting to those supplementary means is unacceptable, if the text is 
sufficient and clear19 unless for supporting and confirming the interpretation that is reached through relying on 
rules that are referred to in Article 31.20 
In contrast, the intentional school which begins the interpretation by determining the common 
intention’s members21 argues that the approach of supplementary means is a lawful method to interpret treaties22 
therefore it prevails on the text because it is effective to explore the common intention of parties23 by referring to 
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 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 art 31(1). 
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 Asif H. Qureshi, Interpreting WTO Agreements: Problems and Perspectives (CUP, 2006) 18, 20. 
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 See, Crema and Crema, above n 12; Lauterpacht, above n 24;  McNair, above n 2, 381; McTaggart Sinclair, above n 43, 
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 Siemens v. the Argentina Republic (Decision of Jurisdiction) (2004) ICSID No ARB/02/8, [81]. 
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 Sinclair, above n 5, 131. 
7
 Ibid 130. 
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 Ibid 105, 131. See, ‘Law of Treaties’ [1966] II (2) YILC, 220.   
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 Sinclair, above n 5, 134. 
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 Ibid 130. See, Villiger, above n 54, 427. 
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 Noble Venture (Inc. v. Romania) (Award ) (2005) ICSID Washington No ARB/01/11, [52].  
13
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 Treaty Interpretation: General Principles of International Law, International Judicial Monitor. 
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 See, Gidon Gottlieb, 'The Interpretation of Treaties  y Tribunals' (1969) 63 (4) Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law at its annual meeting (1921) 122.. 
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 Villiger, above n 54, 345. See, McNair, above n 2 411; Hall, above n 40, 110. 
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 Lauterpacht, above n 23. 
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 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 art 32 (a) and (b). See, Dixon, above n 32, 73. 
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 Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (Judgment) [1927] PICJ (ser A) 5 No 10, 16. See, Brownlie, above n 6, 634; Hall, above n 40, 
110. 
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 Crawford, above n 3, 383. See, McNair, above n 2, 415; Jacobs and Jacobs, above n 44; Interpretation of Article 3, 
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negotiations of concluding treaties, even when the text is clear.1  However, proponents of the textual approach 
argue that supplementary means such as preparatory works are a secondary rule and the authentic common 
intention that shall be sought to is reflected in the text,2 while preparatory works can be resorted to for the goal 
of confirming the ordinary meaning of the text or clarifying the unclear text.3 This is attributed to the attitude of 
the textual approach to adopt a hierarchical structure that distinguishes between primary and secondary 
interpretative rules4 therefore they consider preparatory works as a secondary rule that shall not be used to 
derogate from the textual rule.5  Nonetheless, Article 32 of the VCLT enforces no time-based restriction on 
resorting to preparatory works6 and it does not give preparatory works less status that other interpretative rules 
that are resorted to in Article 31,7 however, the VCLT restricts using supplementary means of interpretation 
through determining the conditions of resorting to them in Article 32.8 Therefore, it seems that supplementary 
means of interpretation implicitly fall within the scope of secondary interpretative norms since they cannot be 
used in isolation from the text,9 otherwise this can be inadmissible.10 
  
Good Faith Principle  
Treaty interpretation, in accordance to paragraph 1 of Article 31, has to be consistent with the doctrine of good 
faith11 that falls within the arena of international customary law12 and attributed to the legal doctrine of pacta 
sunt servanda.13 It is indicated that ambiguity in the field of treaty interpretation is due to the absence of the 
principle of good faith14 that is significant to regulate adopting interpretative rules.15 This regulatory function 
makes the good faith principle as a flexible instrument that is more consistent with circumstances of cases16 to 
enhance the quality of implementing rules and norms.17 Accordingly, the standard of case-by-case is adopted, 
rather than a hierarchical structure, to regulate adopting interpretative rules; therefore, cases’ circumstances shall 
be considered to determine which interpretative rules shall be used.18 Nonetheless, it is possible to reach more 
than one incompatible interpretation by employing different interpretative rules; however, this shall be resolved 
through relying on the good faith principle that requires adopting the interpretation that makes the treaty more 
effective instead of other interpretations that make some parts of this treaty useless or without meaning.19 This is 
more compatible with the effectiveness principle20 that requires granting an effective meaning to the entire treaty 
without exceeding the contents of its texts.21 
Indeed, giving the entire treaty effective meaning during the process of interpretation is compatible with 
the doctrine pacta sunt servanda that requires the compliance with conventional responsibility in a good faith22 
to protect members’ lawful expectations.23  However, this requires not considering incompatible subsequent 
practices with written texts, otherwise subsequent practice can lead to modify conventional provisions24 that can 
be departed and derogated from by invoking subsequent practices.25 Therefore, modifying conventions shall be 
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occurred through concluding other conventions,1 whereas allowing the modification by invoking the subsequent 
practice may cause loosing treaties’ contents. 2  However, subsequent practices may constitute international 
customs that lead to modify treaty since international customs cannot be excluded by invoking the principle 
pacta sunt servanda.3 Nonetheless, international customs may be excluded, when the same treaty determines the 
method of modification.4  
As a result, interpretative rules that are referred to in Articles 31 and 32 shall be considered along with 
the good faith principle. This part discusses different approaches and views with respect to implement these 
interpretative rules in regard to alleged restrictions on implementing them. Nonetheless, the VCLT does not 
tackle this argument because of not adopting an explicit hierarchical structure regarding the implementation of 
interpretative rules. However, this hierarchical structure can be derived from reviewing relevant reports of the 
ILC that can assist in interpreting the VCLT along with the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties 
1968. 
 
Part THREE: Hierarchical Structure of Interpretative   Rules   
The VCLT has a remarkable status in international law since its provisions are widely adopted by tribunals 
therefore the VCLT has been considered as an essential part of the contemporary international law.5  It is 
indicated that Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT are codified to reach the correct interpretation,6 resolve the 
argument between proponents of various interpretative rules and enhance the predictability about treaty 
interpretation.7 Nevertheless, it is argued that the VCLT has failed in resolving these issues because it does not 
regulate operating and adopting interpretative rules; 8  this is attributed to the attitude of codifying general 
interpretative principles9 without providing a hierarchical structure of adopting interpretative rules.10 It is argued 
that the lack of the hierarchical structure is obvious in Article 31(3) that requires considering external materials 
to the treaty in question at the same level of the treaty itself at the time of interpretation.11 This criticism is based 
on deciding whether the VCLT provides a hierarchical structure with regard to adopt and apply interpretative 
rules; however, this can be clarified through referring to relevant reports of the ILC with respect to conclude the 
VCLT since these reports are assistant in the process of interpreting the VCLT.12 
Initially, it shall be noticed that Article 31 is recognized as an interpretative rule of international 
custom13 and it comprises the main interpretative approaches in one conventional provision14 with the heading 
‘General rule of interpretation’ to operate all paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of Article 31 together in the process 
of interpretation.15 It seems that this codification is the reason behind critiquing the failure of the VCLT to 
regulate the adoption of interpretative rules. However, the ILC indicates that this codification of Article 31 is 
logical because this Article includes extrinsic elements in separate paragraphs that follow other interpretative 
rules in previous paragraphs.16 By examining Article 31, paragraph 1 embraces the textual, the contextual and 
the objective and purpose approaches along with the principle of good faith, while paragraphs 2 and 3 comprise 
external elements that shall be considered along with the contextual approach and paragraph 4 refers to the 
intention of parties. Accordingly, external elements are not inferior of other interpretative approaches that are 
considered in paragraph 1 of Article 3117 because this codification is logical therefore it cannot be adopted as a 
hierarchical structure, according to the ILC’s view.18 
Nonetheless, examining the attitude of the ILC leads to conclude that the textual approach is the first 
rule in the hierarchical structure with regard to adopt interpretative rules. The conventional text, in the view of 
ILC, is the most effectual way to discover the common intention of parties19 and other interpretative rules can be 
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resorted to, when this text is ineffectual to achieve the purpose of determining this common intention. 1 
Therefore, the ILC emphasizes that treaty interpretation shall be launched by referring to the text 2  which 
embraces members’ common intention. 3  Additionally, the contextual approach is the second rule in the 
hierarchical structure; the ILC confirms that the logical approach stipulates that the contextual approach shall be 
directly resorted to, when the text is insufficient to achieve the goal of interpretation4 and this has been adopted 
by the vast majority of jurists and tribunals. 5  As, the codification of the contextual approach in separate 
paragraphs (2-3) of Article 31 is compatible with the nature of the contextual approach that is broad and 
embraces other interpretative elements.6 With regard to the purpose and objective approach, the purpose and 
objective of treaties cannot be used in isolation to discover the common intention which is crystalized in the 
ordinary meaning of texts.7 In fact, codifying the objective and purpose approach along with the contextual 
approach in Article 31(1) instead of codifying the former in a separate provision is more satisfactory because this 
precludes from exploiting the former approach to achieve self-interests.8 Consequently, this implicit hierarchical 
structure can be summarized as: 
… the interpreter has to start with the hard core of the operation, which is the text to be 
interpreted (that is, the words and language of the provision); before moving from the text, if 
need be … , but still by way of internal inference (‘internal’ to the instrument bearing the 
interpreted text), to context, which consists of the structure and the other provisions of the 
instrument (and related instruments), to the ‘object and purpose’ of this instrument, if the object 
and purpose can be fathomed from its provisions, including its preamble where they are 
frequently expressly stated.9  
In addition, it is argued whether the codification of supplementary interpretative means in a separate 
Article 32 10  constitutes a hierarchical structure 11  that either distinguishes between primary, secondary and 
supplementary interpretative rules of Articles 31 and 3212 or in favor the textual approach.13 The nature of 
supplementary means such as preparatory works requires codifying these means in a separate Article 32 because 
this is necessary to consider the situation of countries that did not participate in drafting the treaty in question14 
because such countries would need to examine this treaty’ preparatory works before adopting it, if the 
interpretative rule of preparatory works is granted more weight than the text.15 Nonetheless, these countries 
cannot avoid the impact of considering preparatory works in the process of interpretation by invoking their not 
participation in drafting and codifying the treaty in question.16  Nonetheless, it is emphasized in the United 
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties that this codification in two separate provisions does not exclude the 
supplementary interpretative means from the interpretation, subsequently, both Articles 31 and 32 shall be 
simultaneously operated. 17  Nonetheless, the VCLT explicitly regulates and restricts the employment of 
supplementary interpretative means in Article 32. The latter limits resorting to these supplementary instruments 
for the goal of either confirming the result of interpretation that is reached by adopting interpretative rules of 
Article 31 or deciding which meaning is correct when Article 31 leads to either obscure or ambiguous meaning 
or unreasonable result, according to Article 32. Accordingly, the superiority is implicitly granted to interpretative 
                                                          
1
 See, McLachlan, above n 8. 
2
 ‘Law of Treaties’ (1966) II (2) YILC, 220. 
3
 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Un Doc A/CONF.39/SR.1- SR.5, 1st -83rd comms, 1st sess, (26 March-
24 May 1968) [63].  
4
 ‘Law of Treaties’ (1966) II (2) YILC, 220. 
5
 Ibid 218. See, Maki and Peter, above n 21. 
6
 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Un Doc A/CONF.39/SR.1- SR.5, 1st -83rd comms, 1st sess, (26 March-
24 May 1968) [66].  
7
 ‘Law of Treaties’ (1966) II (2) YILC, 220.   
8
 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Un Doc A/CONF.39/SR.1- SR.5, 1st -83rd comms, 1st sess, (26 March-
24 May 1968) [67].  
9
 Julian Davis Mortenson, 'The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention Hostile to Drafting History?' (2013) 107(4) 
The American Journal of International Law 780, 782. 
10
 See, Linderfalk, above n 43. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Un Doc A/CONF.39/SR.1- SR.5, 1st -83rd comms, 1st sess, (26 March-
24 May 1968) [38]-[39]. 
13
 Jacobs and Jacobs, above n 44, 138. See, United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Un Doc A/CONF.39/SR.1- 
SR.5, 1st -83rd comms, 1st sess, (26 March-24 May 1968) [65]. 
14
 Ibid.  
15
 Ibid [10].  
16
 Crawford, above n 3, 384. See, Sinclair, above n 5, 144 
17
 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Un Doc A/CONF.39/SR.1- SR.5, 1st -83rd comms, 1st sess, (26 March-
24 May 1968) [66].  
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.59, 2017 
 
200 
approaches that are referred to in Article 31, while the supplementary instruments of Article 32 have to be 
limited to the function that is determined in Article 32; as a result, such supplementary instruments can be 
considered supportive and secondary;1 consequently, they shall not be widely used to depart from the text2 and 
derogate from obligations. 3  As a result, the VCLT adopts an overall approach with respect to treaty 
interpretation; it is debated that ‘a safe guide to decision on this issue will not be found in the chimera of the 
imputed intention of the parties alone. Rather, the interpreter must find concrete evidence of the parties' 
intentions in this regard in the material sources referred to in Articles 31-2, namely: in the terms themselves; the 
object and purpose of the treaty; the rules of international law; and, where necessary, in the travaux’.4 
 
Conclusion 
This research discusses whether the VCLT adopts a hierarchical structure to regulate the adoption of 
interpretative rules that are codified in Articles 31and 32 in order to resolve the uncertainty with respect to 
applying these rules. This paper discusses the attitude of the ILC to codify interpretative rules in the VCLT as a 
respond to the uncertainty of applying interpretative rules by international tribunals; in addition, it refers to 
controversies between scholars with respect to the implementation of interpretative rules by considering views of 
the main interpretative schools that are the textual, the contextual and the objective and purpose. Nonetheless, 
this paper reviews ILC’s relevant reports to the VCLT along with the United Nations Conference on the Law of 
Treaties 1968 in order to facilitate the interpretation of the VCLT; this review, which is referred to in the third 
part of this research, leads to conclude that the VCLT implicitly adopts a hierarchical structure that regulates the 
adoption of interpretative rules. This hierarchical structure stipulates resorting to the textual approach at the first 
step of treaty interpretation to discover the common intention, while other interpretative rules can be resorted to 
when the text is insufficient. Therefore, the contextual approach shall be directly, when the text is insufficient to 
fulfill the purpose of treaty interpretation. With regard to the purpose and objective approach, the latter cannot be 
used in isolation from other approaches to avoid exploiting it to achieve self-interests. Nonetheless, 
supplementary means shall be exclusively employed to either confirm reachable interpretation by the 
aforementioned approaches or to decide which meaning is correct, when these aforementioned approaches lead 
to either obscure or ambiguous meaning or unreasonable meaning, according to Article 32 of the VCLT. 
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